

# Criminal Judicial Determination of “Revolving Door” Corruption: A Perspective on Power-Related Corruption in the Professional Stage

Yubo Shao\*

Yunnan Normal University, Kunming, Yunnan, 650500, China

\*Corresponding author: [Yubo Shao, 3497643826@qq.com](mailto:Yubo Shao, 3497643826@qq.com)

**Copyright:** 2026 Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC 4.0), permitting distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited, and explicitly prohibiting its use for commercial purposes.

**Abstract:** “Revolving door” corruption is often shrouded in a “legal guise,” characterized by option-based and covert features. It is primarily divided into two types: post-employment option-based corruption and post-employment influence-based corruption. In criminal judicial practice, difficulties arise in determining the imputation of the criminal subject, the distinction between crime and non-crime, and the differentiation between this crime and that crime. To address these issues, this paper focuses on post-employment option-based corruption. Proceeding from the constitutive elements of the crime, it analyzes core issues such as the relationship between acts of seeking benefits and acts of accepting property, the determination of subjective intent, and the nature of “labor remuneration,” comprehensively evaluating whether the conduct constitutes a crime and, if so, which crime.

**Keywords:** Post-Employment Option-Based Corruption; Behavioral Nexus; Labor Remuneration; Judicial Determination

**Published:** May 13, 2026

**DOI:** <https://doi.org/10.62177/chst.v3i2.1377>

## 1. Introduction

The essence of “revolving-door” corruption lies in the primary objective of seeking non-productive power rents <sup>[1]</sup>. This is achieved through methods such as “preemptive nest-building,” “resignation with evasion,” and “continuing to hold positions after retirement,” thereby facilitating the exchange of interests between political and business roles. However, “revolving-door” corruption is, at its core, a variant of traditional corruption that shares certain characteristics with it—such as strong concealment, manifested in more covert behavioral tactics, relationship networks, and power-for-money transactions. Its most prominent feature is option-based arrangements, where public officials and petitioners agree in advance to exchange their commitments for a “position-based salary” upon leaving office or retiring. Meanwhile, based on the fundamental characteristic of optionization, specific features such as premeditation and the concealment of causal relationships have emerged. Meanwhile, based on the fundamental characteristic of optionization, specific features such as premeditation and the concealment of causal relationships have also emerged. This corrupt practice employs the identity transition of public officials between “resignation and re-employment” as a cover, facilitating temporal and spatial transactions of interest transfers through the monetization of power. Its social harm not only severely undermines the integrity of public officials’ duties but also violates the traditional diagnostic logic governing the elements of conventional bribery offenses. The ambiguous boundaries of ‘remaining power influence’ after resignation further complicate the determination of the crime of accepting

bribes through influence.

Current academic research on “revolving door” corruption primarily focuses on political science and disciplinary inspection and supervision studies, emphasizing phenomenon analysis, policy improvements, and the refinement of public official exit mechanisms. However, systematic studies from a criminal law perspective regarding its judicial determination remain relatively scarce. Addressing these gaps, this paper, based on typological classification, focuses on examining the judicial determination logic for post-service power-based corruption. It analyzes key elements—including the correlation between profit-seeking behaviors and acceptance of bribes, the evidentiary approach to “prior agreements,” and the nature of “labor remuneration”—aiming to provide valuable insights for judicial practice.

## **2. An Overview of “Revolving Door” Corruption**

### **2.1 “Revolving Door” Corruption**

“Revolving door” corruption refers to corrupt practices where public officials exploit their power and influence during their tenure when transitioning between government and corporate positions to seek personal gains. Unlike traditional corruption characterized by “immediate transaction and immediate reward,” this form involves agreements to fulfill commitments after retirement or leveraging remaining power and connections to benefit the employing organization post-retirement. Based on its temporal context and behavioral patterns, “revolving door” corruption constitutes either a “contractual-type” corruption—where officials seek private benefits during their tenure and subsequently profit from position transfers—or an “influence-based” corruption involving the continued exercise of residual power<sup>[2]</sup>. Therefore, “revolving door” corruption can be categorized into two types: Option-Based Corruption After Employment and Influence-Based Corruption After Employment.

### **2.2 Option-Based Corruption After Employment**

The so-called post-power option-based corruption refers to the application of economic options to the political sphere to explain specific forms of power corruption; it involves treating power as capital for long-term investment in hopes of achieving substantial returns<sup>[3]</sup>. The perpetrator does not seek immediate reward but agrees to exchange the promised benefits at a future date. Academic circles have held differing views on defining “a future date”: some scholars argue that in the context of option corruption, this refers to the period after the perpetrator’s resignation or retirement; others contend that it should encompass not only the post-retirement period but also the covert transaction periods during employment once the initial prominence has faded. Whether described as “speaking after leaving office” or “speaking after the initial hype subsides,” both approaches essentially exploit temporal gaps to obscure the causal chain of “power-for-benefit” transactions. The practice of “seeking personal gain during employment and subsequently profiting from position transfers”—a hallmark of “revolving-door” corruption—represents a quintessential manifestation within the spectrum of option-based corruption. Based on this, the author refers to it as post-service option-based corruption. However, it is important to note that conventional post-service option-based corruption encompasses various methods such as individuals or their families acquiring shares, receiving dividends, or obtaining remuneration after leaving their positions. In contrast, the “revolving-door” variant of post-service option-based corruption not only features a “delayed redemption” characteristic but also utilizes position transfers after departure as a mechanism to form a closed loop of “power–position–interest.”

In “revolving door” corruption, alongside corruption involving the exercise of power during employment, there exists another form known as post-employment extended corruption, characterized by the “utilization of residual power influence.” This occurs when public officials, after leaving or retiring from their positions, leverage the influence derived from their previous roles to benefit private enterprises during their subsequent employment. The core mechanism of this extended form lies in the “residual power effect”—that is, even after leaving their positions, their original networks of power relations, informational advantages, and reputational capital can still be monetized. However, this paper focuses specifically on corruption involving the exercise of power during employment and provides a systematic analysis of its legal and judicial identification framework.

## **3. The Logic for Identifying Option-Based Corruption After Employment**

### **3.1 Determining the Connection Between the Act of Securing Benefits and the Act of Accepting Property**

As a special type of bribery offense, the core characteristic that distinguishes “revolving door”-type bribery from ordinary bribery is that the offender’s act of securing benefits for others and the act of accepting property are not concentrated during their term of office, but instead span the two stages of pre- and post-employment. On the surface of the conduct, if the chain of actions of the bribe-taker before and after leaving office is mechanically severed, a situation may arise where “benefits are secured during employment but no money is accepted, and money is accepted after leaving office but no benefits are secured,” making it difficult to identify either individual act as bribery. Therefore, the key prerequisite for accurately determining “revolving door”-type bribery lies in correctly assessing, through the surface of the conduct, whether there is a close connection between the act of accepting property after leaving office and the act of securing benefits before leaving office. Drawing on judicial practice experience, the determination of the connection between the two can be comprehensively evaluated from the following six aspects:

First, assess the degree of closeness in the relationship between the defendant and the entrusting party<sup>[4]</sup>. The relational foundation between the parties is a prerequisite element for determining connection, directly reflecting whether there is a possibility of forming an agreement for “trading power for money.” If the defendant and the entrusting party have developed a close relationship through long-term interactions—such as mutual financial support in economic dealings or frequent mutual assistance in daily life—this indicates that the parties have formed a stable interest-based connection. In such cases, accepting property after leaving office is more likely to be a continuation of the previous exchange of interests, and the connection is strong. Conversely, if the parties only interact due to routine work duties, without any private communication beyond official matters or any personal-level interest-based connection, then the connection between accepting property after leaving office and the prior performance of duties is weak. Furthermore, if the parties have previously had a direct or indirect supervisory-subordinate relationship, and the defendant held the power to influence the entrusting party’s interests during their tenure, there is inherently a basis for forming a power-money transaction. In such circumstances, the connection is significantly stronger. Conversely, if there is no power-subordination relationship between the parties, the connection is relatively weak.

Second, examine the timing of the labor contract signed between the defendant and the entrusting party after the defendant left public office. In post-employment option-type bribery, some entrusting parties use “labor relationships” as a facade, disguising “post-employment remuneration” as consideration for benefit-securing conduct during the defendant’s tenure. In this context, the timing of the labor contract becomes a critical factor in distinguishing “genuine employment” from “disguised power-money transactions.” If the defendant signs a labor contract with the entrusting party shortly after leaving their position—for example, within three months or six months (specific timeframes may be determined based on industry practices and local judicial experience)—and receives “wages” that significantly exceed the market salary level for comparable positions, while the defendant does not actually perform substantive labor or the labor value is grossly disproportionate to the compensation, this indicates that the “employment” is essentially a cover for interest transfers. In such cases, the connection between accepting “labor compensation” after leaving office and the benefit-securing conduct before leaving office is strong. If, however, the defendant establishes a labor relationship with the entrusting party a considerable time after leaving office (e.g., more than one year), and the labor relationship conforms to market practices with compensation matching the labor value, it is difficult to establish a connection, and the connection is weak.

Third, determine whether the benefits secured by the defendant for the entrusting party were legitimate. Legitimate benefits have a statutory or contractual basis for acquisition and do not require the public official’s exercise of authority to obtain them. Illegitimate benefits, by contrast, are inherently illegal or irregular and necessarily depend on the public official’s intervention through their authority, inherently binding them to power-money transactions. Therefore, if the defendant secured legitimate benefits for the entrusting party during their tenure—benefits that comply with laws, regulations, and policies, such as routine administrative permits or compliant project approvals—the connection is weak. If, however, the defendant secured illegitimate benefits that violate legal provisions or harm state, public, or others’ legitimate rights and interests—such as illegally reducing or exempting fines, obtaining priority access to scarce resources, or excluding competitors—this indicates a clear agreement for an exchange of interests between the parties. In such cases, accepting property after leaving office is highly likely to be consideration for those illegitimate benefits, and the connection is strong.

Fourth, assess whether the defendant's conduct in securing benefits for the entrusting party complied with legal and procedural requirements. Procedural legality is a primary standard for examining whether the benefit-securing conduct involved abuse of authority and is also an important basis for determining connection. Public officials must follow statutory procedures and internal management regulations in the performance of their duties, as procedural regularity directly safeguards the fairness of official conduct. If a defendant performs duties in violation of procedures, this essentially constitutes an abuse of authority to secure benefits for the entrusting party, and such conduct inherently carries a tendency toward power-money transactions. Therefore, if the defendant, in securing benefits for the entrusting party during their tenure, violated procedural norms such as workflow, approval authority, or time limits—for example, bypassing key approval steps, unilaterally altering approval standards, or delaying similar matters of other parties to prioritize the entrusting party—this indicates that the benefit-securing conduct was proactive and irregular, and the connection with accepting property after leaving office is strong. Conversely, if the defendant strictly followed statutory procedures and organizational regulations without any procedural irregularities, the benefit-securing conduct falls within the scope of normal duty performance, and the connection with accepting property after leaving office is weak.

Fifth, evaluate the frequency with which the defendant secured benefits for the entrusting party. The frequency of benefit-securing conduct reflects the continuity and depth of the parties' interest-based connection. Multiple instances of securing benefits often indicate that the parties have formed a stable power-money transaction relationship, rather than merely occasional official interactions. If the defendant secured benefits for the entrusting party repeatedly and continuously during their tenure, this indicates a long-term agreement for the exchange of interests between the parties. In such cases, accepting property after leaving office is highly likely to be aggregate consideration for that sustained pattern of benefit-securing conduct, and the connection is strong. If, however, the defendant secured benefits for the entrusting party only on a single, occasional official interaction, and the benefits did not exceed the scope of normal duty performance, it is difficult to establish a stable interest-based connection between the parties, and the connection between accepting property after leaving office and that isolated benefit-securing conduct is weak. It should be noted that "multiple instances" here includes not only securing different types of benefits for the same entrusting party but also securing the same type of benefit for the entrusting party on an ongoing basis at different stages.

Sixth, determine whether the defendant accepted a "relocation fee" (relocation allowance). Given the time lag characteristic of this type of bribery—"benefits secured during employment, money accepted after leaving office"—entrusting parties often attempt to evade legal risk by paying a large, one-time "relocation fee" to the departing public official under the pretext of "assisting the official's transition from public to private sector status." In essence, such a "relocation fee" is not genuine living assistance but rather partial consideration for the benefits the departing official secured for the entrusting party through the abuse of authority during their tenure. It also serves to maintain the parties' interest-based connection and pave the way for subsequent interest transfers, such as "wages." Therefore, if it is established that the defendant accepted a large "relocation fee" from the entrusting party around the time of leaving office, and the amount significantly exceeds reasonable bounds without any genuine or justifiable basis, this directly confirms the quid pro quo relationship between accepting property after leaving office and securing benefits before leaving office, and the connection is strong. If the defendant did not accept such a large "relocation fee," it is difficult to establish a connection on this basis, and the connection is weak.

### **3.2 Defining Subjective Bribery Intent**

Due to the considerable time span between accepting property and securing benefits in "revolving door"-type corruption, defense counsel often argues that the defendant lacked bribery intent at the time the benefits were secured for the entrusting party. The core issue in defining subjective bribery intent in Option-Based Corruption After Employment centers on whether it is based on an agreement of "prior arrangement"—that is, whether the public official, during their tenure, reached an express or implied understanding with the entrusting party regarding "securing benefits during employment and accepting property after leaving office."

According to relevant regulatory documents, including the Supreme People's Court's 2000 Reply and the 2007 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in

Handling Criminal Cases of Bribery, “prior arrangement” is a necessary condition for convicting Option-Based Corruption After Employment as the crime of bribery. Some scholars argue, however, that judicial determination should not be rigidly constrained by the formal requirement of “prior arrangement.” In circumstances where a public official, during their tenure, was not solicited by the entrusting party, and there was no “prior arrangement” between the parties during the employment period, but the official accepts property related to prior official conduct after leaving or retiring from office, the official should be deemed to have bribery intent and be convicted of bribery according to law. The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Bribery and Embezzlement no longer emphasizes “prior arrangement” as a limiting condition, explicitly bringing conduct involving “no arrangement before leaving office, acceptance of property after leaving office” within the scope of bribery. Accordingly, the understanding of “prior arrangement” should not be formally restricted; it may be an express agreement, whether written or oral, or an implied agreement formed through conduct indicating mutual understanding.

The author believes that “prior arrangement” is merely one factor in determining bribery intent and the connection to official duties, rather than a necessary element. The key to criminalizing Option-Based Corruption After Employment lies in whether the actor could have known about the specific solicitation, rather than inferring intent solely from the acceptance of property and the subjective intent behind emotional or relational contacts <sup>[5]</sup>. As long as the perpetrator’s bribery intent can be effectively established, the absence of a “prior arrangement” between the bribe-offering and bribe-taking parties does not preclude the establishment of the crime of bribery.

From a judicial practice perspective, establishing a “prior arrangement” requires two core elements: First, the timing of the formation of the agreement—that is, the arrangement must occur before the perpetrator leaves office, and must be reached either during or after the perpetrator’s act of securing benefits for the entrusting party, but prior to leaving office. If the agreement to accept property is formed only after leaving office, it does not constitute Option-Based Corruption After Employment; it may instead constitute the crime of using influence to accept bribes, or may not constitute a crime at all. Second, the clarity of mutual understanding—that is, the parties must reach a consensus on the quid pro quo relationship between the “benefit-securing conduct” and the “acceptance of property after leaving office.” Such consensus need not be expressed through clear language; it may be comprehensively determined based on objective facts such as the perpetrator’s conduct in performing duties, implicit communications between the parties, and specific arrangements regarding the delivery of property. For example, in the case of Qiu Mou’s bribery, Qiu Mou provided assistance to Liu Mou’s company regarding the safety review of its business premises while in office, and after retirement, accepted 1.4 million yuan from Liu Mou under the guise of “research funding.” The court, considering the close connection between Qiu Mou’s official authority during tenure and Liu Mou’s business operations, the timing of the property delivery, and the absence of any genuine research collaboration, found that the parties had a “tacit” implied agreement that met the criteria for establishing a “prior arrangement.”

Given that perpetrators often use covert means to evade detection, written agreements are rare, and establishing proof primarily relies on constructing a chain of circumstantial evidence. This can be approached from three perspectives: First, examine the distinctive nature of the benefit-securing conduct. If the perpetrator secured illegitimate benefits for the entrusting party while in office, and the realization of such benefits depended on the perpetrator’s exclusive authority without reasonable justification beyond the scope of normal duty performance, then, combined with the subsequent acceptance of property after leaving office, a prior arrangement may be inferred. Second, examine the pattern of interactions between the parties and the characteristics of property delivery. If the parties had no ordinary financial exchanges before the perpetrator left office, yet the entrusting party delivered a large amount of property within a short period after the perpetrator’s departure, and the amount of property is roughly commensurate with the value of the benefits secured, while there is no evidence of genuine labor, investment, or other civil relationships, this may corroborate the existence of a prior arrangement. Third, examine the corroboration between relevant testimonial evidence and objective evidence. By collecting statements and testimony from the perpetrator, the entrusting party, and relevant witnesses, combined with objective evidence such as duty performance records, fund transfer documents, and chat logs, a complete evidentiary chain of “securing benefits during employment—prior mutual understanding—accepting property after leaving office” can be formed. If the perpetrator cannot

provide a reasonable explanation for the source of the property, or if their defense contradicts objective facts, this further strengthens the establishment of a “prior arrangement.”

It should be noted that Article 13(3) of the 2016 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Bribery and Embezzlement provides that “where a person is not solicited during the performance of duties, but later accepts property from another person based on that performance of duties” shall be deemed as “securing benefits for another person.” According to the authoritative interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court, this provision does not apply to circumstances where property is accepted after leaving office, because the pattern of conduct in post-employment property acceptance involves “being solicited during employment without an arrangement, and accepting property after leaving office.” However, the purpose of this provision is to further tighten the net of criminal law and increase the severity of punishment for corruption. On this basis, bringing Option-Based Corruption After Employment within the scope of criminalization does not violate the legislative spirit of this provision<sup>[6]</sup>. In summary, the determination of Option-Based Corruption After Employment must still adhere to the requirement of a «prior arrangement.» It cannot be directly deemed as bribery merely on the basis of accepting property related to the performance of duties after leaving office.

### **3.3 Determination of the Nature of “Labor Compensation” Accepted by Departing Public Officials**

In Option-Based Corruption After Employment, departing public officials often accept property from the entrusting party under the guise of “labor compensation” such as “employment remuneration,” “consultancy fees,” or “advisory fees,” in an attempt to conceal the essence of trading power for money. The determination of the nature of such “labor compensation”—that is, whether the compensation is salary arising from actual labor or consideration for using official authority to secure benefits for another person—is key to determining whether the perpetrator constitutes bribery.

The prerequisite for legitimate labor compensation is the existence of a genuine labor relationship or employment fact, meaning that the departing official must have actually performed the corresponding job duties and provided specific labor services. To determine whether the perpetrator provided genuine labor, it is necessary to examine whether there is a written employment agreement, clear job descriptions, work reports, meeting minutes, project outcomes, and other work records, and whether the labor content is related to the departing official’s professional expertise and work experience. For example, if a departing public official is employed by an enterprise as a technical consultant, actually participates in project plan reviews and technical guidance, and produces relevant work outcomes, the compensation received may be deemed legitimate labor compensation. If the employment agreement is merely a formality, the departing official has not actually provided any labor, or the so-called “work content” requires no professional skills and produces no substantive value—such as holding a nominal “consultant” position without any actual performance of duties—then it should be deemed as “engaging in bribery under the guise of labor compensation.” For example, in the Luo Xusheng case, although the defendant Luo Xusheng signed an employment contract with Zhang’s company after leaving office, there was no evidence showing that he actually provided professional services matching the “relocation fee” or performed the corresponding job duties. The 2.61 million yuan “relocation fee” he received after deducting handling fees upon taking up the position had no substantial connection to his actual work content, professional expertise, or job duties<sup>[7]</sup>.

If the departing public official has actually performed relevant work, it is further necessary to distinguish the nature of the amount of labor compensation. Legitimate labor compensation must conform to fair market standards and be commensurate with the type, duration, intensity, difficulty, and market conditions of the labor provided. The nature of the amount of labor compensation may be evaluated by reference to the labor compensation standards for the same industry and position, taking into account factors such as the departing public official’s professional level, labor duration, and work outcomes. If the amount of compensation significantly exceeds the reasonable market range without any justifiable basis, it shall be presumed to be the amount of bribery. The determination of the amount of bribery may, from a perspective favorable to the defendant, be calculated by subtracting the normal compensation for actual work performed from the defendant’s actual gains. For example, in the case of Huang, former General Manager of the Asset Management Department of a state-owned commercial bank, he provided assistance during his tenure to facilitate a company actually controlled by Huang (the same surname)

entering the bank's designated client list. The parties agreed that consideration would be paid in the form of "compensation" after Huang left office. After resigning, Huang signed an employment contract with a subsidiary of that company, stipulating an annual salary plus bonus totaling 10 million yuan. By the time the case was uncovered, the actual property accepted exceeded 42 million yuan. The amount of this "compensation" far exceeded the reasonable salary for comparable positions in the financial industry and was directly linked to the benefits Huang had secured for the other party during his tenure, making it clearly unreasonable. In the end, the bribery amount for this factual finding in Huang's case was the sum of the "relocation fee," "bonus," and the difference in salary.

Due to the covert nature of "labor compensation," judicial determination must rely on a complete chain of evidence to exclude reasonable doubt. Drawing on various items of evidence in the case, the following evidence should be examined with particular focus: First, evidence related to the employment relationship. Examine whether the timing of the employment agreement and its terms are reasonable, and whether there are any anomalies such as backdating or vague provisions. Second, evidence related to the payment of compensation. Examine whether the payment schedule, changes in amount, source of funds, and other aspects of the "labor compensation" are connected to past official conduct. Third, corroboration between testimonial evidence and objective evidence. Collect statements and testimony from the perpetrator, the entrusting party, and relevant witnesses to ascertain the true purpose of the employment and the substantive nature of the "labor compensation."

## Conclusion

The governance of "revolving door"-type corruption is a contest of legal wisdom. As an important line of defense in anti-corruption efforts, criminal justice must, while adhering to the bottom line of the rule of law, actively adapt to new forms of corruption and continuously improve the precision and scientific nature of determination. Only by doing so can we effectively combat the gray areas of rent-seeking, cut the chains of interest transfers, deepen the anti-corruption struggle, and at the same time ensure the normal and healthy flow of talent between government and business, thereby fostering a clearer rule-of-law environment for high-quality economic and social development. There is still much room for improvement in the study of criminal judicial determination of "revolving door"-type corruption. It is hoped that this exploration of the criminal judicial determination of "revolving door"-type corruption will make a modest contribution to the governance of corruption in both theory and judicial practice.

## Funding

This research project is supported by the 2025 Graduate Research Innovation Fund of Yunnan Normal University (Project No.: YJSJJ25-B19) and the 2024 Special Research Project on "Research on the Definition of Illicit Gains from Disciplinary Violations" conducted by Yunnan University of Discipline Inspection and Supervision (Project No.: 24YJX019).

## Conflict of Interests

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

## Reference

- [1] Li, B. Y., & Lü, W. L. (2014). Analysis and governance of "option corruption": A mirror of "bone-scraping therapy" and the "hot furnace principle". *Journal of the Party School of the Sichuan Provincial Committee of the CPC*, (1), 33–39.
- [2] Ma, W. T., & Shi, C. L. (2019). An analysis of the derivative logic, characteristics, and governance paths of option corruption. *Leadership Science*, (8), 31–34.
- [3] Wang, T. X. (2014). The causes and countermeasures of interest conflicts in option corruption. *Journal of Henan Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, 41(4), 20–24.
- [4] Criminal Trial Division II of the Supreme People's Court. (2024). *Guidance on trial of duty-related crimes (Vol. 3)*. Law Press.
- [5] Wang, H. (2021). On the determination of post-position financial behaviors: A perspective from Article 13 of the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate's "Interpretation on embezzlement and bribery". *Journal of Chengdu University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition)*, 29(5), 36–42.

- [6] Ai, P. (2025). Research on the identification of the nature of new and invisible corruption. China Fangzheng Publishing House.
- [7] Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission. (2025, December 22). Resigning from public office to accept a "settlement fee" from a boss—Power-money transactions even when cloaked in invisibility ultimately cannot escape detection. Retrieved from [http://www.nydi.gov.cn/sitesources/nysjwjw/page\\_pc/xsqjw/tbx/aljs/article0bdb4fc447774699a3465851d7b761ee.html](http://www.nydi.gov.cn/sitesources/nysjwjw/page_pc/xsqjw/tbx/aljs/article0bdb4fc447774699a3465851d7b761ee.html)