The Impact of Enterprise Digital Intelligence Transformation on Cash Holdings: Theoretical Mechanisms and Empirical Evidence from China

Authors

  • Mingxuan Lv Xi'an Polytechnic University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62177/apemr.v2i6.1003

Keywords:

Digital Intelligence Transformation, Cash Holdings, Precautionary Motive, Agency Costs, Corporate Governance, Textual Analysis

Abstract

In the context of the sweeping global digital economy, the deep integration of digital technologies—such as big data, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and blockchain—with the real economy has become a critical engine for high-quality enterprise development. While existing literature has extensively discussed the impact of digital transformation on total factor productivity and innovation output, its influence on corporate financial policies, particularly cash holding decisions, remains under-explored. This paper empirically investigates the impact of enterprise digital intelligence transformation on corporate cash holdings using a comprehensive dataset of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2013 to 2022. The study constructs a robust index of digital transformation through textual analysis of annual reports. The empirical results demonstrate that digital intelligence transformation has a significant and robust negative impact on the level of corporate cash holdings. Theoretical analysis reveals that digitalization optimizes cash management through three distinct channels: (1) The "Information Effect," where improved forecasting capabilities reduce the precautionary demand for cash; (2) The "Governance Effect," where enhanced transparency and internal controls curb agency costs and the hoarding of free cash flow; and (3) The "Supply Chain Effect," where digital supply chain finance accelerates working capital turnover. Furthermore, heterogeneity analysis indicates that this inhibitory effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with lower analyst coverage, and companies located in regions with weaker marketization. This research not only enriches the theoretical framework regarding the economic consequences of digital transformation but also provides critical empirical evidence for corporate liquidity management strategies in the digital era.

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References

Almeida, H., Campello, M., & Weisbach, M. S. (2004). The cash flow sensitivity of cash. The Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1777-1804. (Explanation: Fundamental paper on financial constraints and cash management.)

Bates, T. W., Kahle, K. M., & Stulz, R. M. (2009). Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to? The Journal of Finance, 64(5), 1985-2021. (Explanation: The most cited paper on the precautionary motive and the rise of corporate cash holdings.)

Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith, J., & Servaes, H. (2003). International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1), 111-133. (Explanation: Key reference for the "Agency Motive" and governance mechanisms.)

Harford, J., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F. (2008). Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(3), 535-555. (Explanation: Discusses how governance structures affect cash policies, supporting your "Governance Effect" mechanism.)

Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329. (Explanation: The seminal work on Agency Theory, essential for explaining why managers hoard cash.)

Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. London: Macmillan. (Explanation: The origin of the transaction and precautionary motives.)

Miller, M. H., & Orr, D. (1966). A model of the demand for money by firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80(3), 413-435. (Explanation: The classic stochastic model for cash management.)

Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187-221. (Explanation: The foundation of Information Asymmetry theory and Pecking Order theory.)

Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., & Williamson, R. (1999). The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics, 52(1), 3-46. (Explanation: The "Bible" of empirical cash holding research, outlining the Trade-off Theory.)

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How to Cite

Lv, M. (2026). The Impact of Enterprise Digital Intelligence Transformation on Cash Holdings: Theoretical Mechanisms and Empirical Evidence from China. Asia Pacific Economic and Management Review, 2(6). https://doi.org/10.62177/apemr.v2i6.1003

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