

# Ethical Dilemmas and Institutional Purification in East Asia's Relationship-Based Capitalism: China vs. Japan

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**Abstract:** East Asian economies often operate on relationship-based capitalism, where personal ties and networks shape business and governance. This paper examines the ethical dilemmas arising from such systems in China and Japan, and how each country pursues institutional purification to address misconduct. In China, the tradition of guanxi, the personal connections in China, fosters trust and reciprocity but blurs the line between gift-giving and corruption. Japan's corporate networks emphasize loyalty and harmony, yet can lead to insider favoritism and cover-ups. We compare how these relational systems create ethical challenges and examine reforms: China's sweeping anti-corruption campaigns and Japan's corporate governance and compliance initiatives. Through a comparative analysis, we highlight the cultural underpinnings of ethical conduct in each country and the institutional reforms implemented to restore integrity. The study finds that while relationship-based practices are deeply rooted in social values, both nations recognize the need for rule-based frameworks to curb abuses. Strengthening ethics in East Asian capitalism requires balancing cultural relationship norms with transparent, fair institutions.

**Keywords:** Relationship-Based Capitalism; Guanxi; Institutional Reforms

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## 1.Introduction

East Asian business systems have long been characterized by a reliance on personal relationships and networks rather than purely legalistic, arm's-length dealings<sup>[1]</sup>. This relationship-based capitalism stands in contrast to Western rule-based capitalism. In relationship-centric systems, trust is built through long-term personal connections, mutual obligations, and often informal agreements. Scholars note that China's economy in particular can be viewed as a relationship-based network capitalism rather than a purely market-driven system<sup>[2]</sup>. Such networks can enhance cooperation and information sharing, but they also raise ethical dilemmas when personal loyalty conflicts with impersonal fairness.

China and Japan, two of East Asia's largest economies, provide instructive examples of relationship-based capitalism. In China, the concept of guanxi describes the web of personal ties that facilitate business and government dealings. In Japan, inter-firm networks like keiretsu (corporate groups) and enduring employer-employee bonds reflect a relational approach. Both cultures are influenced by Confucian traditions valuing harmony, loyalty, and hierarchy, which reinforce the importance of relationships in economic life<sup>[3]</sup>. However, those very relationships can lead to ethical grey areas: nepotism, favoritism, corruption, and lack of transparency. This paper investigates the ethical issues inherent in these systems and how each country

attempts an institutional purification, a cleansing of corrupt or unethical elements, to align business practices with universal ethical standards.

## 2. Relationship-Based Capitalism in East Asia

Relationship-based capitalism refers to economic systems where business transactions and resource allocations are heavily influenced by personal relationships and networks. Unlike in rule-based capitalism where transactions are governed by formal contracts and regulations, in relationship-based systems trust and mutual obligation take center stage. Confucian philosophy in East Asia emphasizes hierarchical relationships and virtues like loyalty and reciprocity. These cultural values encourage people to prioritize trust within their in-groups such as family, close colleagues, and to maintain harmony, sometimes over strict rule-following. As a result, doing business often involves cultivating personal goodwill like favor exchange and showing respect to build long-term bonds. In many East Asian economies, capital and credit were traditionally allocated through networks of families, clans, or political allies, especially when formal institutions like impartial courts or robust financial markets were underdeveloped. This led to the entrenchment of *guanxi* networks in China and *keiretsu* in Japan, as well as similar network-based systems in South Korea and elsewhere. These networks provided stability and trust in uncertain times but also created closed circles that could exclude outsiders.

While relationship-based capitalism can yield benefits such as strong loyalty, efficient informal coordination, and quicker dispute resolution within the network, it also poses ethical challenges. The next sections delve into how this manifests distinctly in China and Japan.

## 3. Guanxi Capitalism in China

In China, *guanxi* describes the personal connections and reciprocal favors that grease the wheels of commerce and governance. A person's *guanxi* network – composed of family members, former classmates, colleagues, local officials, etc. – is a valuable asset. Business deals often arise not just from profit calculations but from who you know. Trust is highly localized: one trusts known contacts, sometimes more than abstract legal protections.

*Guanxi* networks align with Confucian virtues of loyalty to one's group and filial piety, creating a moral obligation to help friends and relatives. Indeed, it is argued that *guanxi* complies with classic Confucian values of maintaining harmonious relationship<sup>[4]</sup>. For example, showing gratitude through gifts or favors is seen as virtuous. However, this clashes with universalistic ethics: research finds that while *guanxi* may be culturally justified, it cannot be justified in terms of utilitarian ethics that prioritize overall social welfare<sup>[5]</sup>. In other words, what benefits one's inner circle may harm fairness and efficiency in society at large.

Ethical dilemmas in China's relationship-based system include Corruption vs. Gift-Giving, Nepotism and Favoritism, Conflict of Interest, Lack of Transparency. Corruption vs. Gift-Giving: There is a fine line between culturally appropriate gift exchanges and bribery. When does a gift to a bureaucrat become an unethical bribe? The ambiguity can be exploited to hide corrupt dealings under the guise of *guanxi*. Paying facilitation fees or offering lavish banquets to secure business favors are common practices that put officials in ethically compromising positions.

Nepotism and Favoritism: Hiring or promoting someone based on personal relationship rather than merit is a common expectation within *guanxi* culture. While it fulfills social obligations to take care of one's own, it violates principles of fairness and competence. For instance, a contractor with the right connections might win a project over a more qualified competitor lacking those connections.

Conflict of Interest: Officials or managers embedded in dense networks might face conflicts between their duty to the public or company and their loyalty to friends. A government officer might look the other way on regulatory violations by a friend's company. Or a bank official may approve a loan to a poorly-performing business run by someone from their hometown, prioritizing personal loyalty over fiduciary responsibility.

Lack of Transparency: Dealings based on personal negotiations often happen off-record. Decisions made through backdoor agreements undermine transparent governance. Outsiders perceive the system as opaque and unpredictable – it's who you know, not what you do. This erodes trust in formal institutions, as people come to believe only relationships matter.

Empirical studies illustrate these issues. Lovett et al.<sup>[6]</sup> famously described Chinese business as driven by personal connections, noting that China is not just moving towards market capitalism but rather towards a relationship-based network capitalism<sup>[7]</sup>. They evaluate *guanxi* from an ethical perspective and acknowledge both its advantages and drawbacks<sup>[6]</sup>. On one hand, *guanxi* can substitute for weak legal enforcement by building trust; on the other, it can lead to inefficiencies and moral hazards where decisions are made for relationship reasons rather than merit or law<sup>[8]</sup>. When relationships reign supreme, those outside the favored network suffer, and overall societal progress may stall due to nepotistic inefficiency.

#### 4.Relationship Networks in Japan


Japan's form of relationship-based capitalism has different manifestations. Through the late 20th century, the Japanese economy was dominated by *keiretsu* – groups of interlinked companies with cross-shareholdings, centered often around a main bank. Major *keiretsu* (e.g. Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo groups) created an inner circle of companies that preferentially did business with each other, sharing information and shielding one another from hostile takeovers. At the same time, Japanese corporate culture encouraged lifetime employment and seniority-based promotion within firms, fostering strong loyalty between employees and employers. These structures reflect a relational system valuing stability and long-term association over short-term, arms-length transactions.

Japanese culture, influenced by Confucian and indigenous values, stresses harmony and group cohesion. Companies often refer to themselves as a family. Managers may feel a paternalistic responsibility for subordinates' well-being beyond work. Decision-making tends to be consensus-driven to maintain group harmony. All these aspects reinforce relationships and trust within organizations or business groups.

Within a *keiretsu* or tight-knit industry group, opportunities may be denied to outsiders. For example, a supplier outside the *keiretsu* might find it hard to secure contracts, no matter how competitive, because the business goes to an insider partner. This raises questions of fairness and stifles competition. Conversely, insiders might feel pressured to not betray the group by whistleblowing or speaking up about misconduct, leading to ethical silence. A cultural emphasis on not bringing shame can lead companies to cover up problems rather than address them transparently<sup>[9]</sup>. In Japan's corporate history, there have been cases of accounting fraud and product defects being concealed. A notable example was the Olympus scandal where executives hid huge investment losses for years to avoid losing face. Such cover-ups are facilitated by the close relationships and loyalty within the company – employees hesitate to go against their superiors or the family, even when ethics demand it. In government-business relations, the practice of *amakudari* involves senior bureaucrats retiring into high-ranking jobs at companies they once regulated. This common practice creates a reciprocal relationship: companies hire ex-officials for their connections and influence, while bureaucrats, expecting a future cozy job, may be lenient toward those firms while still in office. This raises corruption and conflict-of-interest concerns, as regulatory oversight might be compromised by personal ties. Loyalty and conformity in Japanese organizations can sometimes suppress individual moral judgment. If a superior or the group decides on an unethical course like falsifying data or paying off an organized crime group to settle a problem, subordinates may go along rather than speak out, to avoid disrupting group harmony. The ethical climate can become one of obedience and loyalty over integrity, unless strong countermeasures are in place.

Japan's ethical dilemmas came to global attention in the 1990s and 2000s through a series of corporate misconduct cases and financial scandals<sup>[10]</sup>. In the Lost 20 Years after the 1990s bubble burst, many companies and banks engaged in dubious practices to survive. Corporate scandals and illegal behavior were frequently reported in the media, prompting public outcry<sup>[11]</sup>. Each major scandal spurred calls for better business ethics and compliance in Japan<sup>[12]</sup>. Mizobata<sup>[13]</sup> observes that despite numerous reforms to corporate laws in that period, unethical incidents persisted, leading the business community to stress the importance of tackling ethics issues head-on<sup>[13,14]</sup>. For example, Toyota has a web of affiliated companies with cross-shareholding and interlocking relationships. Such tight networks provide stability and trust, but can also foster insularity and favoritism.

Fig. 1 An example of a keiretsu structure (Toyota Group)



## 5. Ethical Dilemmas in Relationship-Based Systems

Relationship-based capitalism in East Asia yields a set of recurring ethical dilemmas. While the specifics vary between China and Japan, several common themes emerge. Below is a summary of key ethical challenges inherent in these systems:

Personal relationships can normalize bribery as a cost of doing business. What one person calls a bribe, another may frame as a customary gift or facilitation payment. The dilemma is balancing cultural traditions of gift-giving and reciprocity with the need to prevent corruption. For instance, in China lavish gifts or banquets for officials were long seen as polite gestures, but they create obligations that undermine fair decision-making. Similarly, in Japan, extravagant entertainment for clients, could edge into kickbacks. Drawing the line is ethically challenging. In a relational system, giving jobs or contracts to family and friends is expected as loyalty. However, this contradicts principles of meritocracy and equal opportunity. Companies struggle between hiring the CEO's trusted cousin or the best-qualified external candidate. Government offices face pressure to favor acquaintances in procurement. The ethical dilemma is whether to honor personal loyalty at the expense of fairness and competence. Both Chinese and Japanese cultures prize loyalty – to one's superiors, one's group, one's contacts. Yet loyalty can become toxic when it means covering up wrongdoing to protect the group or an individual. Employees might keep silent about a fraud out of loyalty to their boss, or officials might ignore a partner company's violations. This loyalty-versus-honesty conflict is central: maintaining harmonious relationships can directly conflict with being transparent and truthful.

**Insider Confidence vs. Outsider Exclusion:** Relationship-based dealings build deep trust internally – partners within a network have confidence in each other and may even bypass formal contracts. However, outsiders often see the system as rigged or exclusionary, which raises ethical issues of justice. A startup entrepreneur in China without political *guanxi* might have great ideas but cannot get financing or permits because they lack connections. In Japan, a small firm not affiliated with a large group might be shut out of supply chains. The ethical question here is how to ensure some level of fair access and competition in an environment dominated by closed networks.

To navigate these dilemmas, East Asian societies have increasingly recognized the need for what this paper calls institutional purification – deliberate efforts to cleanse or reform institutions so that ethical norms and rules override the negative side of personal relationships. The next sections explore how China and Japan have approached this purification process.

## 6. Institutional Purification Efforts in China

The Chinese government, particularly under President Xi Jinping, has embarked on aggressive campaigns to root out corruption and instill discipline – effectively seeking to purify the system of its worst ethical abuses. The most prominent initiative is Xi's anti-corruption campaign, launched after he took power in 2012, which targets corrupt officials at all levels of the hierarchy.

**Scope of the Campaign:** Xi vowed to crack down on both tigers and flies – meaning high-ranking leaders and low-level cadres alike. This was unprecedented; previous enforcement often spared the powerful. The anti-corruption drive is both punitive

and preventative. It famously adheres to a Punish the past to prevent future approach. We can break down the approach into phases, reflecting an evolving strategy.

The initial phase relied on deterrence. Through high-profile investigations, prosecutions, and even severe sentences including life imprisonment or occasionally execution for egregious cases, the campaign instilled fear. Officials would not dare to engage in graft because the likelihood of being caught and punished had sharply risen. As a result, in the early years, there was a wave of self-policing – officials became more cautious, and some even reportedly reduced lavish spending or resigned to avoid scrutiny.

The second phase emphasizes institutional restraints to make corruption difficult or impossible. Xi Jinping famously said Power must be caged by the system, indicating that regulations and oversight structures should box in officials' discretion. This led to new or revamped institutions: a strengthened Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) with greater investigative powers, new anti-corruption agencies (like the National Supervisory Commission established in 2018), and tighter rules on official behavior. The idea is that even if an official wanted to be corrupt, the checks and transparency in place would prevent many forms of it – they couldn't get away with it.

The most ambitious phase targets the mindset and culture. The goal is to instill ethical values such that officials do not even desire to act unethically. This is often framed in ideological terms – reviving notions of communist purity and service to the people. The Party has undertaken extensive education campaigns, requiring cadres to study moral lessons, Communist classics, and models of integrity. Xi's slogan encapsulates these three stages: officials won't dare, can't, and don't want to be corrupt. The final stage, don't want, can be seen as a form of moral or institutional purification where the very culture is cleansed of tolerance for corruption.

This multi-pronged approach acknowledges that true purification is not just punishing a few bad apples, but changing the institutional barrel and even the orchard's culture. There have been mixed results so far: on one hand, the campaign has undeniably punished a huge number of malfeasants and likely reduced blatant bribery in the short term; on the other, critics say it sometimes serves political ends and that without deeper rule-of-law reforms, corruption might resurge in new forms. Still, the campaign's intensity signals China's recognition that *guanxi* practices must be kept within ethical and legal bounds. Beyond the anti-corruption campaign, China has implemented other measures for institutional purification. The government has updated laws to criminalize various forms of bribery and influence-peddling more clearly. For example, stricter procurement laws and transparency requirements for officials have been enacted. China has also increased cooperation with international anti-bribery conventions, acknowledging global standards. Periodically, the Communist Party introduces ethical guidelines for members such as the Eight-Point Regulation in 2012 that forbids extravagance and excessive gift-giving by officials. Enforcement of party discipline has become more stringent, and there is greater emphasis on accountability. For instance, officials are now held responsible if subordinates engage in corruption under their watch.

A unique modern initiative is the developing Social Credit System, which in part tracks corporate and individual behaviors. Companies in China are being scored on compliance and honesty; those found cheating or bribing may face bad scores affecting their access to loans or contracts. While this system raises privacy concerns, it reflects an attempt to institutionalize integrity via data-driven oversight.

Despite these efforts, ethical challenges persist. Centuries of *guanxi* culture cannot be wiped out in a decade. Some Chinese business people and officials still navigate gray areas<sup>[14]</sup>. For example, providing consulting fees that mask kickbacks, or using intermediaries to maintain plausible deniability. The sheer scale of China's economy means corruption often shifts rather than disappears (if central government cracks down, perhaps corruption migrates to local levels or to state-owned enterprises). Nonetheless, institutional purification has become a hallmark of Xi era governance, with the leadership explicitly framing corruption as the biggest threat to the Communist Party's legitimacy<sup>[15]</sup>. This rhetoric underscores the ethical dimension: a clean institution is seen as essential for China's political and economic survival.

## 7. Institutional Purification Efforts in Japan

Japan's path to addressing ethical issues in its relationship-based capitalism has been more gradual and driven by corporate and civil reforms. As a stable democracy with a long-established legal system, Japan did not face the kind of pervasive



bureaucratic corruption seen in some developing contexts. Instead, the focus of purification was on improving corporate ethics and governance to prevent the insider abuses and complacency that network capitalism bred.

In the wake of high-profile corporate scandals, Japan moved to strengthen corporate governance. A major step was introducing Japan's Corporate Governance Code in 2015. This code, developed by regulators and industry, laid out fundamental principles for transparent and responsible management. It pushed companies to appoint independent directors, improve board oversight, respect shareholder rights, and disclose more information. The focus on transparency and accountability aims to counteract the old boys' club mentality, ensuring that decision-making considers broader stakeholder interests, not just the inner circle's.

Japanese firms increasingly established compliance offices, hotlines, and ethics training, especially after the early 2000s. The government passed the Whistleblower Protection Act (2004), which shields employees who report misconduct from retaliation. This law was seen as a response to deteriorating business ethics and a tool to encourage insiders to come forward. While whistleblowing initially clashed with Japan's culture of loyalty, over time acceptance has grown that protecting whistleblowers is necessary to uncover wrongdoing. Companies now regularly publish ethics codes and conduct workshops to emphasize that honesty and compliance trump loyalty when the two conflict.

Regulators and prosecutors became more assertive in pursuing corporate fraud and bribery. For example, after a string of bid-rigging scandals in public works, Japan's Fair Trade Commission stepped up antitrust enforcement even among cozy keiretsu partners. The penalties for executives involved in falsifying financial statements were stiffened. This shift signaled that no individual or company is above the law, even if historically they were protected by connections. The arrest of prominent executives like Nissan's Carlos Ghosn in 2018 further reinforced that Japan was willing to take on powerful figures to uphold governance standards.

Perhaps the hardest part of purification is altering the mindset. In Japan, a new generation of managers appears more receptive to global standards of ethics. Business schools and professional organizations promote concepts of corporate social responsibility and ESG criteria, which include anti-corruption and fairness components. The media and public have also become more demanding of corporate accountability, especially as Japan opened to more foreign investors who insisted on better governance. There is a slow cultural evolution where questioning superiors or traditions in the name of ethics is gaining legitimacy. For instance, internal audit departments are more empowered to challenge practices that were previously sacrosanct.

Despite these reforms, Japan's journey is ongoing. Institutional inertia and deep-rooted norms don't disappear quickly. Some companies embraced the governance code only superficially at first – e.g., appointing outside directors who were friends of management. Whistleblowing, while legally protected, is still relatively rare due to social pressures. And scandals continue to occur, suggesting gaps remain.

However, the trend is clear: Japan has moved toward a more rule-based system within its relational context. Mizobata<sup>[13]</sup> observed that throughout the 1990s-2000s, Japan reformed laws and corporate systems yet still saw ethics problems. The reaction has been to double-down on ethics education and compliance. Essentially, Japan's institutional purification is about infusing its strong relational culture with an equally strong culture of corporate ethics and legal compliance. The combination is intended to yield the best of both worlds: the trust and loyalty that improve teamwork and long-term vision, plus the integrity and fairness that ensure sustainability and public trust.

*Table 1 Comparison of China and Japan's Approaches to Cleaner Business and Governance*

| Aspect                  | China  | Japan  |
|-------------------------|--|--|
| Approach Type           | Top-Down: Central leadership imposes discipline on officials and businesses (especially SOEs)                      | Hybrid: Mix of government regulations and market-driven initiatives by companies                             |
| Punitive vs. Preventive | Heavy reliance on punishment for deterrence; moving slowly towards preventive institutions ("cage of regulations") | Focus on preventive measures: internal controls, oversight to stop misconduct before it happens              |
| Cultural Framing        | Anti-corruption framed through traditional moral exemplars and communist ideology of "serving the people"          | Governance reform framed around honor, transparency, responsibility, and earning stakeholders' trust (kandō) |

| Aspect                     | China  | Japan   |
|----------------------------|--|---|
| Public Sentiment           | Some resistance: Older officials resent disruption of traditional guanxi networks                                    | Some resistance: Executives feel too many rules undermine familial trust  |
| Effectiveness              | Dramatic but mixed success: China still scores middling on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index | High effectiveness: Japan ranks as one of Asia's least corrupt countries, ethical issues are typically isolated corporate incidents |
| Political System Influence | Relies on internal Party disciplinary mechanisms; limited media independence   | Benefits from independent media and political opposition to expose scandals   |

## 8. Empirical Analysis: The Impact of Institutional Reforms on Perceived Corruption

To provide further support for the comparative insights discussed above, a simple empirical analysis was conducted to examine whether institutional reforms in China and Japan significantly affected public perceptions of corruption. Utilizing Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores from 1998 to 2023, we created a dummy variable marking the post-reform periods—2012 onwards for China's anti-corruption campaign and 2015 onwards for Japan's Corporate Governance Code. GDP per capita (in thousand U.S. dollars) was included as a control variable to account for the influence of economic development, and year fixed effects were incorporated to capture time-specific shocks.

The following regression model was estimated:

$$CPI_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times ReformDummy_{it} + \beta_2 \times GDPperCapita_{it} + Year\ Fixed\ Effects + \varepsilon_{it}$$


where  $i$  denotes country (China or Japan) and  $t$  denotes year.

The regression results suggest that the reform initiatives, while politically prominent, did not yield a statistically significant immediate improvement in perceived corruption levels. The coefficient on the reform dummy variable was negative but insignificant ( $p = 0.542$ ), indicating that anti-corruption campaigns and governance reforms alone may not swiftly alter public perceptions. By contrast, GDP per capita demonstrated a strong positive and highly significant association with CPI scores ( $p < 0.001$ ), implying that sustained economic modernization exerts a more substantial impact on governance perceptions than isolated institutional reforms.

These findings complement the qualitative analysis, highlighting that while institutional purification efforts in both countries are essential for long-term ethical development, broader structural factors—particularly economic growth—remain critical determinants of perceived integrity. The empirical evidence thus reinforces the view that cultural traditions and institutional efforts must be aligned with broader socioeconomic transformations to effectively address the ethical dilemmas embedded in East Asia's relationship-based capitalism.


The CPI scores were obtained from Transparency International<sup>[16]</sup>, and GDP per capita data were retrieved from the World Bank (2023)<sup>[17]</sup>.

Fig 2. Regression Coefficient Estimates for CPI Scores.



This figure presents the estimated coefficients from the regression analysis examining the effects of institutional reforms and economic development on perceived corruption levels in China and Japan. The bars represent coefficient estimates, while the horizontal lines denote standard errors. A positive coefficient indicates a variable's contribution to higher CPI scores (i.e., lower perceived corruption), whereas a negative coefficient suggests the opposite.

Fig 3. Trends in Corruption Perceptions Index Scores for China and Japan (1998–2023).



This figure illustrates the evolution of perceived corruption levels, as measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), for China and Japan over the period from 1998 to 2023. Vertical dashed lines indicate the onset of major institutional reforms: China's anti-corruption campaign launched in 2012 and Japan's Corporate Governance Code introduced in 2015.

The visual analysis complements the regression findings and provides further insight into the dynamics of institutional purification efforts in China and Japan. Fig. 3 illustrates the trends in Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores from 1998 to 2023. Both countries exhibit gradual improvements in perceived integrity over the period, with China showing a more pronounced uptick following the launch of its anti-corruption campaign in 2012, and Japan maintaining relatively stable but high CPI scores after the introduction of its Corporate Governance Code in 2015. However, despite these observed trends, the improvements appear modest rather than dramatic, especially considering the scale of the policy initiatives.

Fig. 2 presents the regression coefficient estimates from the empirical model. Consistent with the visual trends, the reform dummy variable does not demonstrate a statistically significant immediate effect on CPI scores, suggesting that reforms alone may not swiftly change public perceptions of corruption. In contrast, GDP per capita shows a strong positive and statistically significant relationship with CPI scores, reinforcing the notion that economic development plays a crucial role in fostering perceptions of integrity.

Together, the trend visualization and regression analysis suggest that while institutional reforms in China and Japan contribute to gradual ethical improvements, their effectiveness is significantly conditioned by broader socioeconomic factors. The findings underscore the complexity of achieving ethical capitalism in relationship-oriented societies, where deep-rooted cultural practices and economic structures interact with formal governance reforms.

## Discussion

The analysis highlights that ethical dilemmas in East Asia's relationship-based capitalism are not intractable fate, but challenges that can be mitigated through conscious reforms. Relationship-centered business does not doom a country to corruption or malfeasance; however, it does require calibrated checks and balances to prevent abuse of trust.

One key insight is that culture and institution must align. If a culture prioritizes relationships, then institutions should channel that toward positive outcomes like teamwork, loyalty to ethical principles rather than negative ones. In China and Japan, we



see efforts to recalibrate this alignment.

In China, leveraging the respect for authority and hierarchy to enforce anti-corruption, when top leaders send a signal of zero tolerance, it cascades down the hierarchy. Also leveraging the sense of collective over individual – framing corruption as a betrayal of the people’s trust and the Party’s mission, thereby making it shameful in a cultural sense, not just illegal.

In Japan, leveraging the values of honor and harmony – encouraging companies that an open, honest culture actually preserves harmony in the long run (since scandals cause far greater disruption) and brings honor to the organization. Peer pressure among companies (through industry associations or the stock exchange) to uphold governance standards also turns ethical compliance into a sort of social norm among business circles.

Another discussion point is the potential convergence of systems. As global business norms spread, Chinese firms are learning to operate with more transparent practices. Japanese firms, conversely, are learning to be a bit more flexible and innovative while keeping their ethical improvements. We might speculate that a hybrid model could emerge in East Asia: one that values relationships and formal ethics equally. Such a model could, for example, still emphasize long-term relationship-building with stakeholders but within a framework of integrity.

However, there are risks and downsides to consider in these purification processes. A harsh anti-corruption campaign can create bureaucracy-paralysis – officials afraid to take any initiative because it might be misinterpreted as corruption. Some analysts warn that China’s campaign, while curbing graft, may also deter honest risk-taking and governance reforms. In Japan, too many rules could potentially stifle the agile decision-making that sometimes comes from trust. It’s a balance: too little oversight invites corruption; too much rigid oversight can hamper the very relational strengths like quick informal coordination that these economies excel at.

Finally, it’s important to recognize that ethical business conduct is an ongoing journey, not a one-time fix. As new technologies and globalization bring new ethical questions, both relationship-based and rule-based systems will face fresh dilemmas. The cases of China and Japan show that strong cultural traditions can adapt – sometimes slowly, sometimes quickly under pressure – to modern expectations. The institutional purification in East Asia is still a work in progress, but it offers lessons globally on how to integrate cultural values with universal ethical principles.

*Table 2 Cultural Alignment and Governance Reform: China vs Japan*

| Topic                                | China   | Japan  |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| Alignment of Culture and Institution | Leveraging respect for authority and collectivism to enforce anti-corruption; framing corruption as a betrayal of the people’s trust and the Party’s mission, making it culturally shameful, not just illegal   | Leveraging values of honor and harmony; encouraging companies to build open and honest cultures that preserve long-term harmony, with peer pressure from industry associations and stock exchanges promoting self-regulation |
| Trend of System Convergence          | Increasing emphasis on transparency and standardized practices influenced by global business norms  | Maintaining ethical standards while learning to be more flexible and innovative  |
| Emerging Hybrid Model                | Moving toward a governance model that values both relationship-building and institutional integrity (balancing long-term trust and formal standards)  | Similar trend, aiming for a new East Asian hybrid balancing relationships and formal ethics  |
| Risks and Downsides                  | Strong anti-corruption campaigns risk creating bureaucratic paralysis, deterring officials from taking initiative due to fear of misinterpretation as corruption  | Excessive regulation could stifle the agile, trust-based decision-making that relational business practices traditionally excel at   |
| Overall Reflection                   | Ethical governance is a dynamic, ongoing journey; cultural traditions in East Asia show adaptability to new ethical demands brought by globalization and technological change, offering global lessons on integrating cultural values with universal ethical principles |  |

## Conclusion

Both China and Japan demonstrate that relationship-driven capitalism carries inherent ethical dilemmas, but also that these dilemmas can be addressed through deliberate institutional efforts. In China, centuries-old *guanxi* practices met a formidable response in the form of sweeping anti-corruption measures and tightening of party discipline. In Japan, a business culture once complacent with insider privilege has gradually opened up to transparency and accountability, notably through the introduction of Japan's Corporate Governance Code (effective June 1, 2015).<sup>[18]</sup> These efforts at institutional purification – whether through crackdowns, new laws, corporate codes, or cultural shifts – are steering each country toward a more sustainable ethical footing.

The comparative analysis reveals no one-size-fits-all solution. China's authoritative campaign and Japan's corporate governance evolution reflect each nation's context. Yet, a common goal emerges: to embed integrity into the fabric of economic relationships without destroying the social capital those relationships provide. East Asia's challenge is maintaining the trust and cooperation that relationship-based systems yield, while shedding the corruption and unfairness that often accompany them.

For scholars and practitioners, the cases of China and Japan underscore the importance of aligning informal norms with formal rules. Where personal loyalty is valued, it must be channeled to support ethical outcomes (loyalty to the law and public interest) rather than to subvert them. Where networks dominate, they must be broadened and made porous enough to allow merit and fairness to play a role. Ethical dilemmas will always exist in some form, but with vigilant institutional design and cultural introspection, even deeply rooted systems can reform themselves.

In conclusion, East Asia's experience suggests that ethical capitalism in relationship-oriented societies is attainable. It requires a dual commitment: from individuals, to uphold integrity even when personal bonds tempt otherwise; and from institutions, to create environments where doing the right thing is also the path of least resistance. China and Japan are moving on that path. Their successes and setbacks will provide valuable insights as the global business community continues to grapple with the interplay of relationships, ethics, and capitalism.

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